



Al Jama-ah and Two GNUs:

Being a Player in the Changing South Africa's Political Landscape

Al Jama-ah's NWC

1. Introduction: Political Backdrop

Way back in 1994, South Africa was forced into setting up a Government of National Unity (GNU). Since the country was obliged to shed its apartheid mantle, it was agreed that when it adopts the democratic cloak that former liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) could transform themselves into political parties; this is what happened then and both the ANC and PAC along with AZAPO continued to be active parties to this day; at that time, others such as the New Unity Movement, chose the extra-parliamentary route.

When elections eventually took place, 19 parties contested and among them were the Nationalist Party (NP) and the Democratic Party (DP that later mutated to become the Democratic Alliance [DA]). The latter two were part of the apartheid government and they continued their lives in the new reconstructed political dispensation as part of South Africa's GNU since their 'apartheid-oriented' voters voted them in. Besides their participation, they were respectively challenged by the ANC; the latter remained a dominant political force over the past 30 years. Even though the ANC continued to control the South African political landscape until recently, radical changes appeared in the post-2024 national elections when vast numbers of the electorate chose to vote for other parties instead of the ANC.

When turning to 2019, there was a feeling that after the national elections that a GNU would emerge; this was not to be even though the media mediated this idea; it is assumed that the DA looked forward to this outcome but they were disappointed when the ANC remained in a strong political position. It should be stated that by 2019, the ANC lost a considerable number of votes; but despite the loss, it succeeded to hold onto power and it continued to extend its five-year rule until 2024; the 2024, national elections proved to be a challenge for all parties and more so for the ANC whose loss was palpable.

Though the ANC remained influential, their powers and control gradually waned over the past five years (2019-2024). This, however, got worse during the mentioned period and the result was that its image was not just tarnished but considerably damaged. The latter was because of several ANC members having been accused of corrupt practices and other unsavoury acts. During the 2024 elections, their votes dropped; and in the end, they could only manage to obtain about 40%. This implied that their dominance dwindled and this left the ANC leadership in a vulnerable position.

From then onwards, the ANC leadership seems that as they reflected and critiqued their own political position, they decided – perhaps prematurely - to reach out to those that ideologically differed with them; the ANC gave an extended hand to the DA. Now for it to have gone that route raises many red flags but it demonstrated to what extent it was seeking to survive. The question is: why did its leadership not bother to consider parties that were different from the DA ideologically? It seems that they did not think

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
Aljama-ah

through their position and opted for the easiest pathway that remained fraught with political compromises and challenges. By and large, the 2024 national elections' results forced the ANC to take the GNU route; there was no other option for it. This was something that they, in fact, wanted to avoid using various campaign projects such as their pro-Palestine rhetoric to boost and increase their support at the polls.

It should be recorded, albeit briefly, that the IEC's management, which was responsible for administering the country's elections and that was set up in terms of the 1993 Interim Constitution (later through the 1996 Act of Parliament), seemed to have functioned quite well over the years; but for some reason, it found itself in a compromising posture during the 2024 elections. While its aim was to 'strengthen constitutional democracy through the delivery of free and fair elections', all evidence points to the fact that it has fallen short in delivering fair election results; a few parties including the MK party led by former President Jacob Zuma have taken it to the electoral court; everyone awaits the results with abated breath since the court might request a re-vote; if so, then that will not only be a costly exercise but a very challenging one for the nation let alone for the parties.

Be that as it may, the mere fact that the ANC's support-base decreased with its number of voters slowly diminishing, it suffered severely at the polls. Hence, one noted that the electoral shifts changed South Africa's landscape politically. One of the significant outcomes was that the ANC was coerced to seriously consider various political configurations; in other words, it had to place on its table the idea of coalescing with other parties to retain its powerful position though it was defeated at the polls or it had to consider co-partnering with a strong party remain in the political game.

GNU: Two Models– Dissimilarities and Similarities



Before going any further, this position paper intends to turn to the two GNU models; the rationale for this is based on the fact that even though the ANC had a model, it was the DA under Helen Zille that foisted onto the ANC its model. While this constructed one worked in the DA's interest, the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) that disagreed with the DA model proposed an alternative model; one that was viewed as more practical in the circumstances. At this juncture, it first turns to the former prior to shifting to the latter.

2. The GNU: DA's 'Grand Coalition' Model

The question was: who to bring in as its coalition partner? While many thought that it would reach out to parties with which it had a friendly and not a tendentious relationship over the years, everyone was surprised that it opted to ‘get into bed’ with the neo-liberal oriented DA; a party that do not feel ashamed of being funded by the genocidal maniacs such as the Zionists. The latter, it was affirmed, channelled funds into the coffers of many other South African parties; they included the new kid on the bloc, namely Rise Mzansi that started out in April 2023 and apparently a DA creation with the intention of divide and rule.

Their real goal was to gain a strong foothold into the South African political arena so that they can benefit from the rich resources that belong to the country’s nation. These Zionists, however, succeeded since the South African electorate was and is oblivious of their devious and scheming plans to control lucrative lands in many countries; they in fact, even influenced the IEC officials and this thus raise many red flags with their presence and their acts within the South African arena.

That aside, it is important to note that there was external interference in South Africa’s elections (such as the Americans and other interested stakeholders); and this thus had a negative impact upon the statistical results. Among those that gained from these developments were the DA and its moon-shot pack parties; they were the key beneficiaries of large sums of monies that influenced their policies and their results. Because of these, they managed to secure many votes and even via faulty methods that should still be investigated. As a collective, they brought in more than 2 million votes and placed them alongside the ANC that garnered twice their number even though they were defeated in certain regions.


Being in a strong position politically, it implied that they could enter into an agreement with the ANC via a multi-lateral relationship or worded differently: the ANC and DA could co-govern with the support of other Zionist funded parties. So, it was not a shock when the country witnessed during the post-election phase that the ANC leadership engaged with the DA that they seem to have found political synergy!

Interesting to add at this point is that a Social Research Foundation researcher pointed out that the data that were compiled at different periods (2022, 2023, and 2024) illustrated ‘that there is considerable support amongst ANC and DA voters for the parties to enter into coalition as a government of national unity.’ The survey was useful underlying the fact that the sample of interviewees wanted that these two parties gather their energies and resources to co-govern; this was, however, not a clear-cut issue as desired by those who were interviewed. It should be noted that though these surveys are helpful, they are indeed faulty since the sampling was very small and not impactful; it essentially conveyed the incorrect impression of the South African electorate and its political desires.

An important point to highlight is that the ANC opted not to reach out to like-minded parties though they differed on minor matters; they, instead, approached the DA to consider creating a GNU. The question that should be asked: why did the ANC not consider the EFF or the newly found MK party that were composed of former ANC members. Leaving that aside, it was of interest to observe that the DA – that exuded with confidence - placed their demands on the table relishing the fact that they in a strong position to not only bargain but demand certain posts in cabinet and at other levels. Since then, the writing of a partisan relationship was ‘on the wall’; that is, that a long-list of disagreements automatically appeared and these caused the ANC to rethink their relationship with the DA by stalling their negotiations. Though this ‘grand coalition’ model did not bear the fruit as the DA thought, it was an experiment that seems to be on back burner with the hope it will be given life.

The ANC's GNU

Earlier Developments
Those IN and
Those OUT



Before turning to the next model, it should be stated that the DA preferred to be an equal stakeholder in this configuration since it suited its cunning leadership. This model only included the parties that worked with the DA and that had Zionist funding; by implication, it meant that the other parties were excluded from this model. The question was: Was the ANC prepared to be overwhelmed by the DA and its ilk? The simple answer to this question: it did not foresee and bargain for this outcome; for that reason, it chose not to forge ahead and thus staggered the process.

It should also be recalled that this model did not create space for others who opposed the DA and its ideologically aligned parties; considering this position, parties such as Al Jama-ah was not considered but nor would it have wanted to join this obnoxious group that had nothing positive to say about the Palestinians that are being massacred on a daily basis! In fact, since the results of the election were recorded and analysed, the party never expressed a positive view about the GNU when it included the DA.

It took a firm stand and held the view that it would not share or support the idea of having the DA in government; the party regularly stated that while it had a soft spot for the ANC despite its shortcomings, it could not see itself siding with white rulers and thus never entertained the idea of sharing power with parties that are discriminatory in outlook and that support genocide in Palestine and elsewhere.

3. The GNU: 'Liberation Movement' Model

Amidst these developments, some of the smaller (i.e., PAC) and bigger parties (i.e., EFF) also caucused to see how they could be considered as an alternative grouping with which the ANC could partner to form a GNU; together, the group called themselves the Progressive Caucus. The idea for this group was mooted by the EFF and supported by Al Jama-ah. They brought on board others that included the ATM and the UDM.

During the period when the ANC and the DA were discussing their 'grand coalition' partnership, the ANC cleverly revised a Statement of Intention (SoI); this statement seems to have been constructed on bringing in other partners instead of only the DA and its moon-shot pack members such as the Patriotic Alliance (PA). The purpose, it seems, was to lure into its GNU model other and smaller parties; ones that would add

to the ANC's numbers and thus place the ANC and these partners in a better position to challenge the DA and its ilk.

A quick word about the SoI is in order at this point: **first**, after having browsed through the SoI, the impression is given that was part of process to redirect the ANC and those joining this GNU; **second**, the SoI comes across as a life-line for the ANC in trying circumstances; **third**, though the document's preamble was clobbered together with the spirit of Ubuntu, it did not insert those humanitarian values that stressed the need for the sacred protection of human life and here it could have pointed to the genocide that has been unfolding on a daily basis in and outside Palestine; **fourth**, while the GNU's foundational principles are duly acknowledged, the question is: why did it not categorically underline that parties steer clear of openly identifying with genocidal states and oppressive governments across the globe; **fifth**, that its foreign policy be forthright against any nation-state that go against universal values and practices; **sixth**, though the head of state has been granted the constitutional right and prerogative in appointing individuals into responsible posts that this practice should change; it should instead use collective decision-making process in appointing such personnel; **seventh**, that consultation shall be a key feature of GNU's activities; and **eighth**, that the document should not be cast in stone and be open to amendments as the GNU evolves.

GNU: Latest Developments



3.1 GNU's SoI

The SoI, according to Al Jama-ah, might have been reworked from a position of weakness rather than one of strength. Nevertheless, what may be gathered is that it was an open document; one that attracted the attention of other parties outside the DA's circle. Though it seems to have gained traction and witnessed the PAC and the UDM jumping on board, others were still thinking whether they should do so.

From Al Jama-ah's perspective, it observed that the 'rules of engagement' changed and this prompted it to consider joining; its leadership, however, consulted internally with its counsellors and there was an understanding that it would not enter a GNU with the DA as a key player. Since the SoI opened itself up to other parties other than the DA, it automatically opened opportunities for the party to consider; the outcome on 22 June is now history and the party is in the GNU based on oral agreements and a signed one.

One of the reasons that seems to be of interest to these including Al Jama-ah was that joining this new configuration would contribute to the dilution of the DA's influence and powers. This configured construction thus permitted the smaller parties to boost the ANC as well as the left-wing parties' bargaining abilities; this with the intention of not only denting and weakening the DA and its allies' presence but perhaps with the hope of side-lining if not throwing them off board; if this should happen, then this would be a pivotal victory for the ANC and the smaller left-wing parties.

Even though there is a faint possibility that the DA will remain on board to manoeuvre the developments so that these may serve its interests as well as those of its funders, it might also coerce its leadership to abandon it; but that remains to be seen. Whether that will ever take place is still a conundrum. If, however, it does happen where the DA opts out, then it would indeed work in the ANC's favour; and in all probability, its partners too. Apart from them, it might open the way for both the other two parties, namely the EFF and the MK, to seriously weigh their options to consider joining. Up until this moment, none of them have shown any indication of joining. It seems that if they do not join, then they would be the two that will form an important opposition block in Parliament.

3.2 Al Jama-ah Weighing in

At this point, it is important to provide the reasons for Al Jama-ah's new revised position; it adopted this stance since it views the freshly proposed ANC's SoI – despite the shortcomings pointed out in an earlier section - through a different lens. The ANC's proposal of a recrafted GNU differs from that which it had in mind with the DA; this reconfiguration does not imply being 'in bed' with the DA as many critics assume; nay, it is very different and no doubt challenging.

In other words, joining the 'Liberation Movement' GNU model holds the position that (a) it waters down the DA's political powers, (b) it marginalizes DA's influence in all spheres of government, (c) its critical foreign policy against the Zionist state continues; and (d) its legal quest to charge the Zionist state's political leader for 'crimes against humanity' remains on the cards. Factoring in these elements the following should be observed:

Firstly, Al Jama-ah has not been supportive of a GNU in which the DA is a major political player; it expressed its position quite categorically and it holds onto it to this day. In fact, it is unlikely that the party will adopt any other position towards the DA; a party that have not condemned the Zionist state's atrocious acts of genocide.

Secondly, the party has also stood up against the DA's clandestine position towards the Western Cape's quest to become 'independent;' there is much evidence that underscores the fact that it supported the despicable Referendum Party that arrogantly demands the province's exit.

Thirdly, the party's leadership opted to enter the GNU based on the understanding that the DA's position will eventually fade; considering its weakened status, it was felt that it can join to bolster the liberation movements' stance but also hope that it can contribute in a more meaningful way if it is IN instead of OUT of the GNU.

Fourthly, the leadership contends that being part of the GNU would imply that it can put forward workable proposals and practical ideas that may assist in influencing the GNU's position on different levels and in various ways.

Fifthly, the party expresses the view that with its foot in the GNU, it does not mean that it has a cosy seat next to the group of Zionist funded parties but that it has (a) a voice in the GNU on behalf of its constituencies, and (b) an opportunity to counter any

neoliberal policy proposed in parliament that subtly discriminates and counters important initiatives.

Sixthly, the leadership of the party is aware that many from within and outside the party is not in agreement with the leadership's arguments in being part of the revised GNU initiative; the leadership's position is, however, based on 'an informed risk;' this stance was not taken lightly when it was eventually adopted. The risk is embedded in the fact that the party will use its persuasive political powers to make the necessary legislative changes as it did during the 6th parliament.

Seventhly, the party opines that along with other like-minded parties, which came from the Progressive Caucus, it can sway the views towards supporting progressive positive projects in and beyond parliament; it will employ its strategic position to counter any suspected DA neoliberal moves that deliberately wish to go against human rights and social welfare forces.

Eighthly, the party is also convinced that being part of the re-constructed GNU would mean that it will not only be involved in the National Dialogue (ND) that will take place within the next three weeks but also be a participant in the Social Compact project that will be an outcome of that forum; both are critical as the GNU marches forward.

Ninthly, the ND and other stakeholders will pave the way for a national policy cum fiscal conference; one that will ensure the SCP's formation. The latter will include civil society organizations and other stakeholders that will add their insights to this sector SCP.

Lastly, it sees itself as an important political player that intends to put forward or moot 'decent jobs' programs in parliament; it views its position as a critical one similar to what it had undertaken during the previous parliamentary session.

So, from the above list, the party is taking a worthy risk that will, hopefully, ensure that there are positive returns for our communities across the country. It cannot afford to lose the gains that it has made in both the rural and the metropolitan areas. It has proven to be a noteworthy contributor towards change and thus argue that it can continue with these within the revised GNU setting.

4. Towards a Conclusion

As the party concludes this position paper, it would like to add the following points: as a Political Party, which was founded on Islamic ethos, it continues to serve as 'a platform for all communities' and shows that it continues to demonstrate Al Jama-ah Effect in diverse ways! At present, it is a political party that is leading the socio-political discourses in the reestablishment of a self-determined Government of Local Unity; one that was unfolding in the City of Johannesburg since February 2023.

The party embarked on this journey following a failed DA lead coalition that was due to white arrogance, tyranny, and the subjugation of partner black political parties. The party and its leadership have been paying close attention to this cliché and nuances regarding the DA's brazen conduct as regards the circumstances associated with the GNU.

It is the party's view that the GNU's Political Steering Committee (PSC) is in itself the ultimate battlefield to not only fight for the preservation of our communities' liberty from the neoliberal DA and its support for minority (white) rule but to also endeavour to push them out of the GNU structures completely considering the fact that they only holding onto their 20% and not more.

After a meeting with a delegation from the ANC's NEC and the leader of our party as well as the Gauteng Provincial Chairperson along with the National Head of Strategy the following points were recorded:



Al Jama-ah's initial position was the outright rejection of the GNU; this position was declared to be exactly that at the end of the mentioned meeting. The party subsequently undertook robust engagements and debates within its NWC along with its set of counsellors considering the implications of a perplexed and cornered ANC that was at the mercy of an opportunistic DA.

It is, therefore, against this backdrop that party undertook to test the legitimacy of the process by entering the GNU; this was with complete aggression and tactical battle formation. The party is further cognisant of the fact that its mere rejection and condemnation of the DA's participation in forming the government of the day without meaningful action will not assist in averting the inevitable.

It will not backbench while the gains of our country's democracy are at risk of being reversed; factoring in these, the party opts to step-in, if only to protect the fundamentals of the liberation struggle and aspirations of South Africans. The party plans to participate because it carries a responsible mandate of its voters, and it will not allow anything to be done for our communities without our participation.

In addition and as a token of our efforts and commitment to corrective measures, it plans to have further discussions with political parties in the Progressive Caucus to enter the GNU; this is as a means to create a government that is self-determined to dismantle the DA sponsored narrative of political expediency and the malicious aspersions of its 'grand coalition' model that it had put forward and tried to enforce.

As the party gears up for the GNU 2.0 with an understanding of the DA's malignancy and plot on the benevolent country, the party wishes to register that there will be no three-state solution in the Republic of South Africa! Our beloved country will not be broken down in the lifetime of our parties and communities. South Africa will remain an apartheid free zone and our foreign policy will remain intact; it will not be dissuaded from taking up the concerns of the oppressed communities in other parts of the world.

The party wants to stress that the Justice Ministries globally will not be allowed to regress in any form or way. The party - along with just-loving nation-states - will protect and safeguard access to education and it intends endeavour implementing policies such as securing decent jobs in an already alarming environment of unemployment and soaring inequalities. Though these are but a few examples of non-negotiable imperatives that the party plans to undertake with the purpose of safeguarding its long-list of rights and as the evolving GNU under the ANC's leadership grapples on how to accommodate the DA in their - hopefully -short lived participation.