AL JAMA-AH AND THE TWO GNU’S
1. Introduction: Political Backdrop
Way back in 1994, South Africa was forced into setting up a Government of National Unity (GNU). Since the country was obliged to shed its apartheid mantle, it was agreed that when it adopts the democratic cloak that former liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) could transform themselves into political parties; this is what happened then and both the ANC and PAC along with AZAPO continued to be active parties to this day; at that time, others such as the New Unity Movement, chose the extra-parliamentary route.
When elections eventually took place, 19 parties contested and among them were the Nationalist Party (NP) and the Democratic Party (DP that later mutated to become the Democratic Alliance [DA]). The latter two were part of the apartheid government and they continued their lives in the new reconstructed political dispensation as part of South Africa’s GNU since their ‘apartheid-oriented’ voters voted them in. Besides their participation, they were respectively challenged by the ANC; the latter remained a dominant political force over the past 30 years. Even though the ANC continued to control the South African political landscape until recently, radical changes appeared in the post- 2024 national elections when vast numbers of the electorate chose to vote for other parties instead of the ANC.
When turning to 2019, there was a feeling that after the national elections that a GNU would emerge; this was not to be even though the media mediated this idea; it is assumed that the DA looked forward to this outcome but they were disappointed when the ANC remained in a strong political position. It should be stated that by 2019, the ANC lost a considerable number of votes; but despite the loss, it succeeded to hold onto power and it continued to extend its five-year rule until 2024; the 2024, national elections proved to be a challenge for all parties and more so for the ANC whose loss was palpable.
Though the ANC remained influential, their powers and control gradually waned over the past five years (2019-2024). This, however, got worse during the mentioned period and the result was that its image was not just tarnished but considerably damaged. The latter was because of several ANC members having been accused of corrupt practices and other unsavoury acts. During the 2024 elections, their votes dropped; and in the end, they could only manage to obtain about 40%. This implied that their dominance dwindled and this left the ANC leadership in a vulnerable position.
From then onwards, the ANC leadership seems that as they reflected and critiqued their own political position, they decided – perhaps prematurely – to reach out to those that ideologically differed with them; the ANC gave an extended hand to the DA. Now for it to have gone that route raises many red flags but it demonstrated to what extent it was seeking to survive. The question is: why did its leadership not bother to consider parties that were different from the DA ideologically? It seems that they did not think through their position and opted for the easiest pathway that remained fraught with political compromises and challenges. By and large, the 2024 national elections’ results forced the ANC to take the GNU route; there was no other option for it. This was something that they, in fact, wanted to avoid using various campaign projects such as their pro-Palestine rhetoric to boost and increase their support at the polls.
It should be recorded, albeit briefly, that the IEC’s management, which was responsible for administering the country’s elections and that was set up in terms of the 1993 Interim Constitution (later through the 1996 Act of Parliament), seemed to have functioned quite well over the years; but for some reason, it found itself in a compromising posture during the 2024 elections. While its aim was to ‘strengthen constitutional democracy through the delivery of free and fair elections’, all evidence points to the fact that it has fallen short in delivering fair election results; a few parties including the MK party led by former President Jacob Zuma have taken it to the electoral court; everyone awaits the results with abated breath since the court might request a revote; if so, then that will not only be a costly exercise but a very challenging one for the nation let alone for the parties.
Be that as it may, the mere fact that the ANC’s support-base decreased with its number of voters slowly diminishing, it suffered severely at the polls. Hence, one noted that the electoral shifts changed South Africa’s landscape politically. One of the significant outcomes was that the ANC was coerced to seriously consider various political configurations; in other words, it had to place on its table the idea of coalescing with other parties to retain its powerful position though it was defeated at the polls or it had to consider co-partnering with a strong party remain in the political game.
Before going any further, this position paper intends to turn to the two GNU models; the rationale for this is based on the fact that even though the ANC had a model, it was the DA under Helen Zille that foisted onto the ANC its model. While this constructed one worked in the DA’s interest, the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) that disagreed with the DA model proposed an alternative model; one that was viewed as more practical in the circumstances. At this juncture, it first turns to the former prior to shifting to the latter.
READ PART 2: The GNU: DA’s ‘Grand Coalition’ Model